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Bertrand’s Paradox Revisited: Why Bertrand’s ‘Solutions’ Are All Inapplicable 
 
Darrell P. Rowbottom 
Department of Philosophy 
Lingnan University 
 
darrellrowbottom@ln.edu.hk 
 
For many years, I have agreed with the majority verdict that Bertrand showed that his 
chord paradox is insoluble, and thereby revealed the problematic nature of the 
principle of indifference. But I have now changed my mind, and will here explain 
why. I will make my case without using any formal mathematics. This is just as well, 
I think, because approaching the paradox in a formal fashion is liable to obfuscate the 
oversight that I identify. This oversight seems so obvious, once it is pointed out, that 
it is hard to imagine that it has been repeatedly missed for any other reason. 
 
This turns out to be no victory for the defenders of the principle of indifference, 
however. For first, we will see why the most popular attempt to solve the paradox, 
due to Jaynes (1973), fails. Second, it will emerge that when it is properly understood, 
the paradox is considerably harder to solve than Bertrand appreciated. 
 
Let’s start with the puzzle that generates the paradox. And let’s use Bertrand’s own 
words, to make sure that we are not considering a subtly different scenario: 
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On trace au hasard une corde dans un cercle.  Quelle est la probabilité pour 
qu’elle soit plus petite que le côté du triangle equilateral inscrit? (Bertrand 
1889: 4–5) 
 
I translate this in the following way, which I take to be faithful (if undesirably literal): 
 
One draws at random a chord in a circle. What is the probability for it to be 
smaller than the side of the inscribed equilateral triangle?1 
 
Bertrand proceeds to suggest that this question can be answered in (at least) three 
different ways. How so? Bertrand thinks there are (at least) three different ways to 
draw a chord at random in a circle. 
 
Modern discussions of the paradox – as found in Gillies (2000), and Rowbottom 
(2011) – tend to present these answers in a formal way. But this isn’t really necessary, 
because we can instead recognize that Bertrand just outlines three different methods 
for drawing chords. I’ll call these ‘the three ways’. To make things somewhat less 
abstract, we might instead think of ways to cut a cylindrical cake placed on a flat 
surface into two pieces, with one knife stroke, in such a way that the blade of the 
knife remains perpendicular to the circular surfaces. (Of course, chords have no 
width, whereas knives do. So I’m asking you to think about infinitely thin cuts. But 
you get the gist. Perfectly cylindrical cakes don’t exist either, but presumably that 
doesn’t worry you!) 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 N.B. I take ‘par hasard’ to be best translated as ‘by chance’, and ‘au hasard’ to be best translated as 
‘at random’. A more natural translation is: ‘Draw a random chord in a circle. What’s the probability 
that it’s shorter than any side of an inscribed equilateral triangle?’ 
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The first way involves only moving the knife from left to right before making the cut. 
Or in other words, all possible cuts must be parallel to each other. (Note that how the 
cake is oriented before you start cutting is not specified. We will return to this.) 
 
The second way involves only rotating the knife about a fixed point on the 
circumference of the cake. Or in other words, all possible cuts must pass through the 
same point on the (edge of the) circular cross-section. 
 
The third way involves choosing some point on the circular cross-section of the cake 
at random – for example, by getting a child to stick a (point!) candle in it – and then 
making that the mid-point of the cut. But there is a special rule (implicit in the way 
Bertrand sets things up mathematically). Only one (pre-specified) cut can be made if 
the centre of the circle is the point chosen. 
 
So the problem for the principle of indifference, allegedly, is that assigning 
equipossibility across possible cuts, in these three different scenarios, gives different 
answers to the question set. Disaster. Death to the principle of indifference, except as 
a measly heuristic, and any version of the logical interpretation of probability 
dependent on it! 
 
But wait a minute. We began with the stipulation that ‘One draws a chord at random 
in a circle’ (or for our cake example, ‘One makes a random downward separating cut 
through a cylindrical cake, in one stroke, with the blade remaining perpendicular to 
the circular surfaces’). Is that really what was done in any of the three ways? I don’t 
think so. Rather, in each case, a chord was drawn (or a cut was made) at random from 
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a proper subset of the possible chords that might be drawn (or a proper subset of the 
possible cuts that might be made). 
 
In short, the charge is that none of the methods proposed involves making a random 
pick from all the possible chords (or cuts). So none of proposed solutions, in effect, 
addresses the scenario described. To bring this into relief, imagine I posed the 
following question in an exam paper: “50% of rabbits are black. What is the 
probability that a rabbit selected at random is black?” Would I be obliged to give full 
marks to any answer between zero and unity (or to an answer of ‘the problem is 
underspecified’)? After all, a mischievous student might respond “Take the subset of 
black rabbits. Now pick a rabbit at random from this subset. The probability that it is 
black is one!” I would give the answer zero, and take the student to have willfully 
misinterpreted, if not misunderstood, the question. (I would admire her spirit 
nonetheless!) And if you think this would be fair of me, then you should also agree 
with my refusal to take any of the aforementioned ‘three ways’ as potentially correct 
answers to the question set by Bertrand. 
 
If you still disagree with me, then it would appear, at least at first sight, that you now 
have infinitely many ways to draw a chord (or cut) – and thus, to apply the principle 
of indifference – at your disposal. But some of them look so silly, frankly, that it’s 
hard to imagine anyone would have taken the paradox seriously if they had been 
proposed in place of the ‘three ways’ above. For example, you could just specify two 
particular ways to cut and then have the choice between those two ways be 
appropriately random. Or you could opt for n ways, selected such that the probability 
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comes out to whatever value you want. (And now the principle of indifference is not 
even a heuristic.) 
 
Of course, the ‘three ways’ all involve infinitely many possible cuts. But adding this 
constraint, if you think it should be added, still allows for cutting strategies that 
appear odd. Here’s one: cut the cake such that the ratio of the volumes of the two 
resulting pieces is 1:2.2 And another even more striking possibility, suggested by the 
third way (as I’ve presented it) is simply: cut the cake through the centre. Infinitely 
many chords pass through the centre of a circle; and it was Bertrand’s failure to spot 
this that messed up his calculation for his ‘third way’. 
 
Recognizing this, however, allows us to adjust the ‘third way’ so as to allow all 
possible cuts. We just remove the ‘special rule’ that only one cut may be made 
through the centre. And now, it seems to me, we have a pertinent way to answer the 
question posed. (One point, namely the central one, has an ‘angle of cut’ variable 
associated with it. The others don’t.) We can assign equiprobability to each possibility 
outlined. 
 
This is bad news for Jaynes (1973), who argues that the first of Bertrand’s ways is the 
correct one (or, at least, issues in a calculation that gives the correct answer). But in 
order to see why, we need to consider his argument for preferring the answer arrived 
at by using the first way, which is more nuanced than is sometimes appreciated. In 
essence, Jaynes recognizes that there are infinitely many possible cuts of each length. 
And he reasons from there to the conclusion that considering just one set of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Considering the possible ratios, n:m, makes it apparent that there are infinitely many cutting strategies 
involving infinitely many possible cuts. 
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possible cuts, which is itself an infinite set, will give the same answer as that to the 
original question set. However, his point might have been made much more simply 
and directly than he manages with his talk of ‘rotational invariance’. Instead, consider 
a two-step procedure for cutting the cake. First, orient the cake at an angle of your 
choice, by turning it clockwise (or anti-clockwise) to any extent you desire. Then 
adopt the cutting procedure described in the first way, i.e. only move the knife from 
left to right before making the cut (such that all possible cuts, at this point of the 
process, are parallel). Now all possible chords may be selected. (You may think of 
this as using the principle of indifference twice; once over angles of orientation, and 
once over cuts perpendicular to a straight line drawn across the top of the cake before 
orientation occurs.) 
 
So here’s the rub. We now clearly have two different ways of selecting all the chords; 
the modified version of the third way, where the angle variable is just applied to the 
cut through the centre, and the modified version of the first way, where (random) 
orientation is part of the selection process. But what makes these different from the 
other ways to pick a cut from the set of all possible cuts? If we restricted the problem 
to cuts with a rational length, for instance, one might choose two integers at random, 
n and m, and then choose a cut such that the ratio of the resulting surface areas of the 
top of the cake is n:m. Not restricting the problem in such a way, i.e. allowing 
irrational lengths, just requires a somewhat more sophisticated alternative selection 
process, mathematically speaking. 
 
The conclusion is that none of Bertrand’s ‘three ways’ is a valid potential answer to 
the question that he sets, despite appearances to the contrary. But when the question is 
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properly understood, it is harder to answer, and remains possible to answer in several 
different ways. None of those ways, to the best of my knowledge, has been advocated 
as a unique solution to the paradox.3 
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3 I take this to be further support for the view that: ‘Bertrand’s paradox continues to stand in refutation 
of the principle of indifference’ (Shackel 2007). 
